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Diversification of Europe further: the more the merrier or too much of a 
good thing? 
 
 
Introduction 
Following a period of state endorsement for recognition and accommodation of minority 
groups, recent years have seen a huge wave of backlash against multicultural policies in 
Europe. Amidst growing public concern over the challenges of integrating large-scale 
immigrant populations, which became further complicated within the context of the ‘9/11 
terrorism discourse’ and the ensuing worries about a thrusting radical Islamism (Connolly et 
al. 2015), the state chiefs of major migration destinations in Europe such as Germany, the UK, 
Spain and France finally announced the end of sponsorship for a multicultural society in their 
lands.
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The root causes of this break of faith have long been addressed in scholarship. While liberal 
attitudes favouring ethnocultural heterogeneity are attributable to both the majority and 
minority groups, to the extent of economic and political conjunctures depending on how far 
they give grounds for more ‘newcomers’, negative attitudes are almost always associated with 
the resident citizens of the host society, for at stake here is often the power struggle between 
the two groups, insofar as the latter press for the same economic, social, cultural and political 
rights as enjoyed by the former (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010, Triandafyllidou et al. 2012, 
Crowder 2013, Uberoi and Modood 2015). 
 
                                                 
1
 Following German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who admitted failing to achieve a multicultural society through 
state policies in late 2010, British Prime Minister David Cameron criticised ‘state-sponsored’ multiculturalism 
similarly in favour of a stronger national identity in his country. Likewise, the Spanish and French counterparts 
Jose Maria Aznar and Nicolas Sarkozy joined in soon to announce the abortion of multicultural policies by 
holding them accountable for losing sight of national priorities (The Telegraph 2011). 
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For all that, however, those who feel threatened by an increasingly diversified ethnic 
landscape in Europe are not necessarily limited to the resident nationals only. As the issue is 
one of preserving ‘a reserved space’ in the host societies, which became quite evident with the 
sharp rise of asylum-seekers in several EU lands lately, it may well be the case that the 
resident non-nationals find it equally intimidating in meeting with the side-effects of further 
newcomers in their countries of residence. 
 
Research aim, scope and methodology 
This study intends to give a glimpse of the current debates on an increasingly diversified 
ethnic landscape in Europe by comparing the attitudes between nationals and non-nationals in 
some of the EU’s major immigration lands. Intended by non-nationals here are all persons 
other than citizens of the hosting EU Member States where the study is carried out. The 
research scope includes for this reason immigration with its both intra- and extra-EU 
dimensions, that is to say, inflows from not only other EU Member States but also the 
countries outside the EU. 
 
For statistical assessment, this inquiry starts with offering a null-hypothesis which (when 
considered true) claims significant differences between the attitudes of nationals and non-
nationals. The alternative hypothesis maintains that nationals and non-nationals may share 
more similarities than differences on that score: 
 
h0: Negative attitudes towards further diversification of the ethnic landscape in EU 
Member States are attributable to their resident nationals in the first place. 
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ha: The resident non-nationals may display as much negative concern over further 
diversification of the ethnic landscape in EU Member States as their resident 
nationals. 
 
For hypothesis testing, a survey was carried out in Germany, France, Belgium and the 
Netherlands from 15 July to 14 October 2015. The selection of these lands was based on the 
OECD statistics (2012) indicating a cluster of Member States including these four hosted the 
highest non-national populations in Europe. 
 
The questionnaire prepared for the survey interviews is made up of five closed questions: (1) 
It is a good thing for this country to make room for more immigrants; (2) The labour markets 
in this country are affected negatively by new arrivals of immigrants; (3) People from a non-
immigration background should enjoy a privileged position in this country; (4) I would have 
serious concerns for this country’s national and cultural values if more immigrants arrived in 
this country; and (5) Non-national cultural practices do not fit into the way of living in this 
society. As these are all yes/no questions, the responses they elicit are not meant to include 
the underlying reasons/justifications behind. 
 
The areas these questions investigate are essentially delineated by the two core themes 
underlying the immigration debate across European societies today: first, whether or not the 
host societies perceive immigration as an asset/compensating feature for their own interests 
and, second, to what extent they are willing to accept further arrival of ‘newcomers’. The 
answers to the questions are arranged to fall into six main categories: ‘I strongly agree’, ‘I 
agree’, ‘I disagree’, ‘I strongly disagree’, ‘I neither agree nor disagree’, ‘I have no idea’ and 
failure/refusal to respond. For data analysis, the responses ‘I strongly agree’ and ‘I agree’ are 
to be regrouped under a general category of ‘agreement’, just as ‘I disagree’ and ‘I strongly 
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disagree’ will be taken to represent responses of ‘disagreement’ and ‘I neither agree nor 
disagree’ and ‘I have no idea/I do not want to answer’ to be standing for the remaining 
choices under ‘other’. 
 
Given that the survey questions all call for responses of categorisation rather than numerical 
values, the statistical analysis is based on Pearson's Chi-Square test, with the level of 
significance being 5%, where p< 0.05. 
 
Research design 
For the target population of 100 participants in each selected country, the response rate was 
estimated as 60%. The number of household lists taken as samples were increased in 
accordance, demanding a total of 167 addresses to be contacted in advance (calculated by 
100x100/60). Even if the intended number of 100 interviewed respondents could be achieved 
earlier, all precontacted addresses were visited (as a matter of courtesy). Some of the potential 
participants were away on the visiting days and some others declined to take part or did not 
qualify to respond for reasons of illness, underage etc. In the end, the target population was 
drawn from the first 100 of the entire number of successfully interviewed samples. 
 
The survey was carried out in Berlin, Paris, Brussels and Amsterdam, the capital cities of the 
selected countries, with the distribution of their residents’ demographic qualities in mind. To 
this end, the choice of primary sampling units (PSU) for household surveys was inspired by 
NUTS 2010/EU-27, informing where the resident profiles were mostly diversified. These 
were preset for this research as Neukölln in Berlin; Opéra/Pigalle in Paris, Ixelles in Brussels 
and Geuzenveld-Slotermeer in Amsterdam. The selection of research participants in these 
districts was systematic: for the private household, every third apartment/house number on a 
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randomly chosen street in these districts; for the identification of the research participants in 
each private household, the first person in alphabetical order. 
 
A pre-notification letter was sent three weeks before visiting the 167 potential participants in 
the two randomly chosen streets of each capital city, informing briefly about the aim and 
coverage of the survey interview. The samples were drawn by random selection and 
assignment, in line with multistage cluster/area sampling whereby half of the participants (50) 
were to hold the citizenship of the EU country the survey was carried out and the other half 
(50) that of any other state. To maximise responses and interact with participants in the most 
natural way possible, native speakers with similar research experiences accompanied the 
survey interviews. The sample profile was reduced to only one resident person in each private 
household visited who could be 11 years or older, regardless of whether they were adolescents 
(aged between 15-17), young adults (aged 18-29) or adults (30 and above) or not, after 
stratification by the distribution of the nationals and non-nationals. 
 
In the event of an inadequate level of English proficiency, which was necessary to fill in the 
survey questionnaire by the target household, the ‘back-translation’ technique was employed 
to optimise the survey interviews, as typically consulted in Eurobarometer public opinion 
surveys. To that end, a professional translator changed the questionnaire into the target 
language, depending on the target household’s profile. This text was then changed by another 
professional translator back into English, without having seen the original questionnaire. 
Comparison, and if needed modification, of the wording in both versions were made in the 
end so as to ensure the quality of translation in German, French and Dutch.
2
 
 
                                                 
2
 This would also serve for the Belgian case, given that the country is officially divided into four language areas: 
the French, Dutch, German and bilingual speaking areas (of Brussels in particular). 
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For reasons of dissimilar institutional services in the participating countries, a uniform 
sampling frame was far from being feasible. While the resources for demographic information 
were in Germany based on databases provided by the Statistical Offices at the state/federal 
levels and in France by INSEE (the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies), the 
sampling frames in the Belgian and Dutch cases were the National Registar and PTT (postal 
delivery points), respectively. 
 
Findings 
Germany 
For the 60% estimated response rate in Germany, to make it to the target population of 100, 
130 private households were efficiently visited. On 12 visiting days in total, 18 of the 
potential participants were found to be away, 12 of them refused to take part in the survey, 7 
others ill, too young, old or otherwise to be able to respond. This amounted overall to a 
response rate of 77.9%. 
 
The three age groups according to which the final 100 samples were randomly distributed in 
Germany were represented by 30 adolescents, 22 young adults and 48 adults participants, 
respectively, of whom 44 were males and 56 females. Those who reported to have a higher 
level of education, that is, a tertiary degree from a vocational school or a university (including 
that of a post-graduate/doctorate) were 55, while the remaining 45 held a secondary or a lower 
degree of education. The number of the unemployed amongst these 100 participants in total 
was 24. 
 
When reconsidered on the basis of citizenship, these counts presented a fairly diverse 
distribution. It appeared the nationals were represented by a relatively older population (28 to 
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20 of non-nationals), more males (28 to 16) and fewer employed (35 to 41). Yet, in terms of 
educational levels, participants of both groups were comparable with close frequencies: 
 
Table1: Survey participants in Germany 
 
Citizenship 
Age groups Gender Level of education Status of employment 
Total 
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Nationals 18 12 20 16 34 22 28 41 9 50 
Non-
nationals 
12 10 28 28 22 23 27 35 15 50 
Total 30 22 48 44 56 45 55 76 24 120 
 
 
The findings of the survey’s German leg showed comparable tendencies between the two 
sample groups’ responses. While neither of these were significantly close to the mean, as the 
high standard deviations point out, the similar choices clustered around certain pre-given 
response categories did not go unnoticed: 
 
Table 2: Distribution of responses on a six-category scale in Germany 
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1 13 11 3 6 8 9 8,33 3,56 8 14 7 7 5 9 8,33 3,08 
2 8 12 6 7 8 9 8,33 2,07 10 11 5 9 6 9 8,33 2,34 
3 14 17 3 6 5 5 8,33 5,72 8 21 3 8 4 6 8,33 6,53 
4 7 14 2 3 7 17 8,33 5,99 12 6 3 4 12 13 8,33 4,50 
5 12 15 4 6 6 7 8,33 4,41 14 14 4 7 5 6 8,33 4,50 
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Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the target responses to the survey questions were eventually to 
disclose three general feedback categories of agreement, disagreement and other choices 
suggesting abstention, failure and/or refusal to provide answers. Before interpreting the 
patterns of responses above, the six-response scale was for this reason first of all abridged 
under ‘agreement’, ‘disagreement’ and ‘other’: 
 
Table 3: Responses in Germany 
Questions Categories Nationals Non-nationals Total 
1 
Agreement 24 22 46 
Disagreement 9 14 23 
Other 17 14 31 
Total 50 50 100 
2 
Agreement 20 21 41 
Disagreement 13 14 27 
Other 17 15 32 
Total 50 50 100 
3 
Agreement 31 29 60 
Disagreement 9 11 20 
Other 10 10 20 
Total 50 50 100 
4 
Agreement 21 28 49 
Disagreement 5 7 12 
Other 24 15 39 
Total 50 50 100 
5 
Agreement 27 28 55 
Disagreement 10 11 21 
Other 13 11 24 
Total 50 50 100 
 
 
Of all the response patterns observed in Germany, the second and fifth questions concerning 
negative impacts of further immigration and harmony between national and non-national 
cultural practices in the country showed the most similarities, with a total of just two varying 
responses of agreement and disagreement between the two sample groups, each. Likewise, the 
first and third questions asking whether or not it was a good thing for Germany to make room 
for more immigrants and if people with a non-immigration background should enjoy a 
privileged position in the country showed similar distribution of responses, where the variance 
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was maximum two more/fewer choices. The least similar choices came by contrast in 
response to the fourth question, inquiring about respondents’ concerns for Germany’s national 
and cultural values in the case of further arrivals of immigrants. Interestingly, the non-
nationals’ counts of agreement responses here turned out to outweigh those of the nationals. 
 
The observed frequencies were then processed to obtain the expected counts, according to 
‘row total x column total / grand total’, as the3x4 shaded grids in Table 3 indicate. Based on 
the observed and expected data, the test statistic ‘χ2= ∑ (observed - expected)2/expected’ 
brought out the P-values below, given the 95% level of confidence and 2 degrees of freedom 
(calculated through ‘number of rows – 1 x number of columns – 1’): 
 
Table 4: P-values in Germany 
 
Questions Categories 
Nationals Non-nationals 
P-values Observed 
counts 
Expected 
counts 
Observed 
counts 
Expected 
counts 
1 
Agreement 24 23 22 23 
0,48 Disagreement 9 11,5 14 11,5 
Other 17 15,5 14 15,5 
2 
Agreement 20 20,5 21 20,5 
0,91 Disagreement 13 13,5 14 13,5 
Other 17 16 15 16 
3 
Agreement 31 30 29 30 
0,88 Disagreement 9 10 11 10 
Other 10 10 10 10 
4 
Agreement 21 19,5 18 19,5 
0,75 Disagreement 5 6 7 6 
Other 24 24,5 25 24,5 
5 
Agreement 27 27,5 28 27,5 
0,89 Disagreement 10 10,5 11 10,5 
Other 13 12 11 12 
 
 
France 
The second leg of the survey following Germany took place in France. It took 10 days to 
complete the interviews in Paris, Opéra/Pigalle. Of the pre-scheduled 167 visits during this 
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period, 21 ended with unanswered rings, 16 potential participants refused to take part in the 
survey, 17 others were ill, too young, old or otherwise to be able to respond. In the end, a total 
of 113 private households were successfully interviewed. This amounted to an overall 
response rate of 67.7%. 
 
The classification of the final 100 participants according to the three age groups revealed 27 
adolescents, 23 young adults and 50 adults, who were represented by 42 males and 58 
females. Of these, 62 reported to hold degrees from an institution of tertiary level of education 
as opposed to 38 with a high school degree at the most. The rate of the unemployed 
participants was around one fourth, that is, 27 of them declared to be jobless. 
 
For these findings, participation of similar age groups was observed (16 adolescents, 11 
young adults and 23 adults of national participants versus 15, 9 and 26 of the non-nationals, 
respectively). In terms of gender, the non-national participants were represented by 24 males 
and 26 females, as opposed to 18 males and 32 females of French participants. The level of 
education in this latter group came to be slightly lower: 29 of them had a degree from a 
vocational school or university as opposed to 33 similar degree holders representing the non-
national participants in France. Finally, the counts of the employed and unemployed were in 
both groups almost identical, revealing 37 employed and 13 unemployed nationals, compared 
to 36 and 14 of non-nationals: 
 
Table 5: Survey participants in France 
Citizenship 
Age groups Gender Level of education Status of employment 
Total 
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Nationals 16 11 23 18 32 21 29 37 13 50 
Non-
nationals 
15 9 26 24 26 17 33 36 14 50 
Total 31 20 49 42 58 38 62 73 27 100 
 
 
Against a background of this spread of information, the counts of participant responses as 
observed during the French leg of the survey were: 
 
Table 6: Distribution of responses in France 
 
Questions 
Nationals Non-nationals 
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1 14 7 5 7 9 8 8,33 3,08 8 11 6 7 7 11 8,33 2,16 
2 6 18 6 6 11 3 8,33 5,39 6 16 9 6 6 7 8,33 3,93 
3 13 16 3 5 6 7 8,33 5,05 12 14 3 6 7 8 8,33 4,03 
4 12 11 4 4 11 8 8,33 3,61 6 16 3 3 12 10 8,33 5,24 
5 13 20 7 8 1 1 8,33 7,31 14 17 6 6 3 4 8,33 5,75 
 
 
Like in the German case, the distribution of responses in France was to be reconsidered 
eventually on the basis of three categories only, that is, of ‘agreement’, ‘disagreement’ and 
‘other’, prior to their assessment for statistical analysis decisively: 
 
Table 7: Responses in France 
Questions Categories Nationals Non-nationals Total 
1 
Agreement 21 19 40 
Disagreement 12 13 25 
Other 17 18 35 
Total 50 50 100 
2 
Agreement 24 22 46 
Disagreement 12 15 27 
12 
 
Other 14 13 27 
Total 50 50 100 
3 
Agreement 29 26 55 
Disagreement 8 9 17 
Other 13 15 28 
Total 50 50 100 
4 
Agreement 23 22 45 
Disagreement 8 6 14 
Other 19 22 41 
Total 50 50 100 
5 
Agreement 33 31 64 
Disagreement 15 12 27 
Other 2 7 9 
Total 50 50 100 
 
 
The data distribution in accordance indicated high sets of standard deviation for the two 
sample groups, while an obvious differentiation in their response preferences was far from 
being the case. The maximum variance as to responses of agreement related to the third 
question investigating whether or not people with a non-immigration background should 
enjoy a privileged position in this country. Here, the French nationals gave three more 
responses of agreement. Similarly, in the case of responses demonstrating disagreement, the 
second and fifth questions inquiring about further immigrant arrivals’ negative impacts on the 
labour markets in France and whether or not non-national cultural practices fit into the French 
way of living brought out maximum three extra responses (given by 15 non-nationals to the 
second question versus 12 by nationals, which in the fifth question turned to be the other way 
around, i.e. the nationals’ 15 responses of  disagreement as opposed to 12 of the non-national 
participants). Aside from these findings, nonetheless, the other response preferences 
demonstrated fairly similar tendencies, whereby the two sample groups’ patterns of agreement 
and disagreement differed from each other with two fewer/more choices at the most. 
 
Based on the observed data above, the expected counts of responses were then identified to 
perform the test statistic. Accordingly, the P-values were: 
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Table 8: P-values in France 
 
Questions Categories 
Nationals Non-nationals 
P-values Observed 
counts 
Expected 
counts 
Observed 
counts 
Expected 
counts 
1 
Agreement 21 20 19 20 
0,92 Disagreement 12 12,5 13 12,5 
Other 17 17,5 18 17,5 
2 
Agreement 24 23 22 23 
0,80 Disagreement 12 13,5 15 13,5 
Other 14 13,5 13 13,5 
3 
Agreement 29 27,5 26 27,5 
0,83 Disagreement 8 8,5 9 8,5 
Other 13 14 15 14 
4 
Agreement 23 22,5 22 22,5 
0,77 Disagreement 8 7 6 7 
Other 19 20,5 22 20,5 
5 
Agreement 33 32 31 32 
0,20 Disagreement 15 13,5 12 13,5 
Other 2 4,5 7 4,5 
 
 
Belgium 
The third stop of the survey was Belgium. The 9 visiting days required for the interviews in 
the two randomly selected streets of Brussels, Ixelles yielded 22 unanswered rings. 16 
potential participants declined to take part in the survey, while 17 others were ill, too young, 
old or otherwise to respond. A total of 112 private households were interviewed in the end. 
Overall, this came to a response rate of 67.1%. 
 
The participating adolescents, young adults and adults of the final 100 respondents were 
represented in Brussels by 29, 20 and 51 samples, respectively. The numbers of male and 
female participants here were 53 and 47. The two groups’ levels of education were meanwhile 
relatively high, that is, more than half of the sample population (54) had a higher degree from 
a vocational school or university. The number of employed participants was even higher: 64 
respondents in Belgium declared to have jobs. 
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When seen on the basis of citizenship, the counts of responses Belgian citizens gave and those 
of non-nationals were quite similar. The distribution of age groups in both cases was slightly 
biased towards adults, with more participation of females and those holding degrees from a 
school of tertiary level of education. The status of employment/unemployment was also 
similar. Accordingly, 19 nationals and 17 non-nationals reported to be jobless: 
 
Table 9: Survey participants in Belgium 
 
Citizenship 
Age groups Gender Level of education Status of employment 
Total 
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Nationals 13 13 24 24 26 24 26 31 19 50 
Non-
nationals 
16 7 27 23 27 22 28 33 17 50 
Total 29 20 51 47 53 46 54 64 36 100 
Grand total 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
With this spread of information in the background, the distribution of responses the survey 
participants opted for in the Belgian case appeared as: 
 
Table 10: Distribution of responses in Belgium 
 
Questions Nationals Non-nationals 
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1 9 11 3 8 12 7 8,33 3,20 11 7 5 6 11 10 8,33 2,66 
2 13 9 7 7 6 8 8,33 2,50 10 9 9 10 3 9 8,33 2,66 
3 17 14 5 6 4 4 8,33 5,68 12 20 3 6 3 6 8,33 6,59 
4 9 10 5 10 9 7 8,33 1,97 9 8 10 8 8 7 8,33 1,03 
5 13 17 3 6 7 4 8,33 5,50 12 13 6 6 6 7 8,33 3,27 
 
 
which became after reducing the six response categories to three: 
 
Table 11: Responses in Belgium 
 
Questions Categories Nationals Non-nationals Total 
1 
Agreement 20 18 38 
Disagreement 11 11 22 
Other 19 21 40 
Total 50 50 100 
2 
Agreement 22 19 41 
Disagreement 14 19 33 
Other 14 12 26 
Total 50 50 100 
3 
Agreement 31 32 63 
Disagreement 11 9 20 
Other 8 9 17 
Total 50 50 100 
4 
Agreement 19 17 36 
Disagreement 15 18 33 
Other 16 15 31 
Total 50 50 100 
5 
Agreement 30 25 55 
Disagreement 9 12 21 
Other 11 13 24 
Total 50 50 100 
 
 
Like in Germany and France, a thorough analysis of responses in Belgium indicated similar 
patterns between nationals and non-nationals, with high values of standard deviations 
applying to both groups. The exception here applied to the fifth question, investigating non-
national cultural practices’ fit into the Belgian way of living in the case of which the 
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distribution of agreement responses differed with 5 more national choices from those of the 
non-national participants. The question to which the two groups of participants appeared to 
respond almost identically was the third one inquiring about whether or not people with a 
non-immigration background should enjoy a privileged position in Belgium. While the non-
nationals’ responses of agreement were here just one ahead (32 versus 31 of nationals), the 
nationals’ responses of disagreement outweighed with two extra choices (11 vs 9 of non-
nationals). To be fair, responses to the other questions brought out also fairly similar 
tendencies, where the biggest variance concerned the second question on the new immigrant 
arrivals’ negative impacts on the Belgian labour markets. The nationals’ 14 responses of 
disagreement here differed to a certain extent from 19 of non-nationals, while preferences for 
disagreement were somewhat less: 22 of nationals vs 11 of non-nationals. 
 
With the expected counts calculated on the basis of the observed data above, the test statistic 
introduced the P-values below:  
 
Table 12: P-values in Belgium 
 
Questions Categories 
Nationals Non-nationals 
P-values Observed 
counts 
Expected 
counts 
Observed 
counts 
Expected 
counts 
1 
Agreement 20 19 18 19 
0,90 Disagreement 11 11 11 11 
Other 19 20 21 20 
2 
Agreement 22 20,5 19 20,5 
0,57 Disagreement 14 16,5 19 16,5 
Other 14 13 12 13 
3 
Agreement 31 31,5 32 31,5 
0,87 Disagreement 11 10 9 10 
Other 8 8,5 9 8,5 
4 
Agreement 19 18 17 18 
0,81 Disagreement 15 16,5 18 16,5 
Other 16 15,5 15 15,5 
5 
Agreement 30 27,5 25 27,5 
0,59 
Disagreement 9 10,5 12 10,5 
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Other 11 12 13 12 
 
 
The Netherlands  
The last round of the survey took place in the Netherlands. Here, a total of 11days were spent 
to conduct the interviews in the two randomly chosen streets of Amsterdam’s Geuzenveld-
Slotermeer. 22 of the potential respondents turned out to be absent at their previously 
contacted addresses, while 25 of them refused to participate in the survey and 11 others were 
ill, too young, old or otherwise to be able to join in. In the end, a total of 109 private 
households were successfully interviewed. This amounted overall to a response rate of 65.3%. 
 
The classification of the conclusive 100 participants in the Netherlands according to age, 
gender, level of education and status of employment revealed a distribution of 24 adolescents, 
35 young adults and 41 adults, who were made up of 41 males and 59 females, with 34 of 
them holding a degree of secondary level of education and 66 that of tertiary, respectively. Of 
the total number of participants here, 20 were unemployed. 
 
When viewed in terms of the two sample groups, these counts suggested fairly different rates. 
First, apart from the age groups which indicated almost no variance between the nationals and 
non-nationals, the two groups of participants diverged slightly in terms of gender: 22 males 
and 28 females of the former versus 19 males and 31 females of the latter. The levels of 
education were however quite close. While the number of those with degrees from schools of 
the tertiary level of education amongst nationals was 34, it was for non-nationals 32. 
Likewise, the number of the employed amongst the former was 41, compared to 39 non-
national participants who reported to have jobs: 
 
Table 13: Survey participants in the Netherlands 
Citizenship Age groups Gender Level of education Status of employment Total 
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Nationals 13 17 20 22 28 16 34 41 9 50 
Non-
nationals 
11 18 21 19 31 18 32 39 11 50 
Total 24 35 41 41 59 34 66 80 20 100 
Grand total 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
Against a background of these participant profiles, the core task, that is, finding out the ways 
in which the selected two groups of citizens answered the survey questions introduced the 
following distribution of responses: 
 
Table 14: Distribution of responses in the Netherlands 
 
Questions 
Nationals Non-nationals 
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1 9 11 8 9 6 7 8,33 1,75 8 9 12 7 7 7 8,33 1,97 
2 11 7 7 10 7 8 8,33 1,75 8 8 12 8 5 9 8,33 2,25 
3 14 18 3 4 5 6 8,33 6,15 11 17 5 5 5 7 8,33 4,84 
4 6 17 6 6 7 8 8,33 4,32 14 7 10 7 6 6 8,33 3,14 
5 12 14 4 9 5 6 8,33 4,03 11 13 8 9 3 6 8,33 3,56 
 
 
When reduced to three response categories, as formerly done in the former three cases of Germany, 
France and Belgium, the above-given distribution in the Netherlands appeared as: 
 
Table 15: Responses in the Netherlands 
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Questions Categories Nationals Non-nationals Total 
1 
Agreement 20 17 37 
Disagreement 17 19 36 
Other 13 14 27 
Total 50 50 100 
2 
Agreement 18 16 34 
Disagreement 17 20 37 
Other 15 14 29 
Total 50 50 100 
3 
Agreement 32 28 60 
Disagreement 7 10 17 
Other 11 12 23 
Total 50 50 100 
4 
Agreement 23 21 44 
Disagreement 12 17 29 
Other 15 12 27 
Total 50 50 100 
5 
Agreement 26 24 50 
Disagreement 13 17 30 
Other 11 9 20 
Total 50 50 100 
 
 
Accordingly, the responses in the Netherlands did not seem to be evenly distributed from the 
mean values. The lowest standard deviation was recorded in the case of the first question, 
investigating whether or not it was a good thing for the Netherlands to make room for more 
immigrants, whereby the values appeared to be close to each other (1,97 for non-nationals and 
1,75 for nationals). As for the comparison of responses, there emerged, broadly speaking, 
fairly similar tendencies between the two sample groups. The biggest variance concerned the 
fourth question investigating concerns for the Netherlands’ national and cultural values in 
case of more immigrants’ arrival. The responses of nationals and non-nationals differed here 
with 5 more choices of the latter (17 versus 12 of nationals). For the third and fifth questions 
looking into privileges for people with a non-immigration background and non-national 
cultural practices’ fit into the Dutch way of living, the responses of agreement and 
disagreement could show differences as many as four (the nationals’ 32 agreement responses 
versus 28 of non-nationals to the third question and the non-national participants’ 17 of 
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disagreement as opposed to 13 of nationals in the case of the fifth question). Other than these, 
variations between the two groups’ preferences did not exceed three counts, as applicable to 
responses of disagreement to the second and third questions and the choices of agreement in 
relation to the first question. Put in brief, based on the preferences of respondents in the Dutch 
case, one could argue for largely symmetrical choices between the national and non-national 
survey participants. 
 
Given the observed counts of responses and the expected frequencies calculated in 
accordance, the test statistic brought out the following P-values for the Dutch case: 
 
Table 16: P-values in the Netherlands 
Questions Categories 
Nationals Non-nationals 
P-values Observed 
counts 
Expected 
counts 
Observed 
counts 
Expected 
counts 
1 
Agreement 20 18,5 17 18,5 
0,82 Disagreement 17 18 19 18 
Other 13 13,5 14 13,5 
2 
Agreement 18 17 16 17 
0,82 Disagreement 17 18,5 20 18,5 
Other 15 14,5 14 14,5 
3 
Agreement 32 30 28 30 
0,66 Disagreement 7 8,5 10 8,5 
Other 11 11,5 12 11,5 
4 
Agreement 23 22 21 22 
0,53 Disagreement 12 14,5 17 14,5 
Other 15 13,5 12 13,5 
5 
Agreement 26 25 24 25 
0,67 Disagreement 13 15 17 15 
Other 11 10 9 10 
 
 
Comparative assessment and discussion 
To begin with the participant profiles first: for nationals, the youngest contribution was 
recorded in Germany (with 18 adolescents and 12 young adults out of 50 participants) where 
the status of employment was together with that in the Netherlands the highest (41 counts out 
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of 50), as well as female participation with more than twice as much of males (34 to 16). The 
oldest sample group in the category of nationals was in Belgium (with 24 adults). The highest 
level of education amongst the four sample groups of nationals turned out to belong to the 
Dutch (with 34 holders of a tertiary school degree). For non-nationals, on the other side, the 
youngest representation took place in Belgium (with 16 adolescents of survey participants) 
and the oldest in Germany (with 28 adults). The highest female participation in the non-
national sample group was in the Netherlands (with 31 counts), where the level of education 
proved to be fairly high, close to its highest value for the nationals (32 out of 50 respondents). 
In this category, the widest contribution was noted in France with 33 participants having a 
degree from a university/vocational school at the least. Of the non-national samples, it was in 
the Netherlands where the ratio of the employed to the jobless was the biggest, almost 4 to 1 
(with 39 employed versus 11 unemployed), which was followed in the second place by 
France’s 36 reportedly working participants and 14 jobless. 
 
Overall, including both nationals and non-nationals, majority of the participants belonged to 
the adult category (189 out of 400 samples in grand total of four countries), were mostly 
employed (293 versus 107 reportedly jobless) and of females (226 to 174 males). What’s 
more, a higher rate of the respondents turned out to hold degrees from a tertiary level school 
than of secondary or lower level (237 to 163). 
 
Table 17: Cross-comparison of sample groups 
Citizenship Selected case 
Age groups Gender 
Level of 
education 
Status of 
employment 
Total 
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Nationals 
Germany 18 12 20 16 34 22 28 41 9 50 
France 16 11 23 18 32 21 29 37 13 50 
Belgium 13 13 24 24 26 24 26 31 19 50 
Netherlands 13 17 20 22 28 16 34 41 9 50 
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Total 60 53 87 80 120 83 117 150 50 200 
Non-nationals 
Germany 12 10 28 28 22 23 27 35 15 50 
France 15 9 26 24 26 17 33 36 14 50 
Belgium 16 7 27 23 27 22 28 33 17 50 
Netherlands 11 18 21 19 31 18 32 39 11 50 
Total 54 44 102 94 106 80 120 143 57 200 
Grand Total 114 97 189 174 226 163 237 293 107 400 
 
 
The research hypothesis (the so-called null hypothesis) underpinning this study suggested that 
negative attitudes towards diversification of the ethnic landscape in EU Member States are 
attributable to their resident nationals in the first place. This point of departure was in line 
with the mainstream assumption, as observed for instance in the mass media, according to 
which nationals tend to be more critical of immigrants, which is why their attitudes towards 
ethnocultural diversification should be more dismissive than those of non-nationals. To be 
able to argue that the null hypothesis was agreeable on the basis of the population sample 
above, the adopted Pearson chi-square test of independence had to reveal significant 
differences between the responses of national and non-national participants. Given the 5% 
level of significance, this meant, the preset α:0.05 alpha level could by no means be 
overreached. The test statistic performed for each of the five survey questions revealed, 
however, the following distribution of P-values: 
 
Table 18: Comparison of P-values 
Questions 
P-values 
Germany France Belgium Netherlands 
1 0,48 0,92 0,90 0,82 
2 0,91 0,80 0,57 0,82 
3 0,88 0,83 0,87 0,66 
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4 0,75 0,77 0,81 0,53 
5 0,89 0,20 0,59 0,67 
 
 
These values are obviously too high, in fact close to the probability level of 1 in some cases. 
Aside from variations from one country to the other, there is accordingly no considerable 
outcome to maintain that the observed differences between the national and non-national 
groups’ responses in Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands are of statistical 
significance. Based on this finding, the study offers to reject the null hypothesis that negative 
attitudes towards diversification of the ethnic landscape further in EU member states are 
attributable to their resident nationals in the first place. 
 
As a rule, feelings of aversion in this category are attached to the nationals, to the extent that 
non-nationals need to be in solidarity with the ‘newcomers’, for these are the people with 
whom they jointly constitute the minority population. And if there are similar patterns 
between the attitudes of nationals and non-national on this score, as it came out in this study, 
the underlying causes deserve careful scrutiny. 
 
First, as the findings of this study confirmed it, the levels of education and employment status 
which the nationals and non-nationals currently hold in many EU Member States are contrary 
to popular belief not so differential (Keeley 2009; Benton et al. 2014). As the gap between the 
nationals and non-nationals became closer in recent times (the education levels of immigrants 
in some countries like Spain and the UK prove to be even higher than those of the natives at 
present), their attitudes towards ethnocultural diversification tended to verge on each other. 
Such patterns have been suggesting that the more the levels of education and job status 
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become comparable, the more similar the two groups’ thoughts about demographic change 
turn out to be vis-à-vis immigration. 
 
Then, one needs to make particular mention of the current terrorism discourse here. It has 
been around fourteen years since the so-called 9/11 events and matters concerning 
immigration are in Europe firmly tied to the security agenda. While a considerable number of 
immigrants have been developing closer sympathy with anti-European movements, with 
growing senses of marginalisation and discrimination in their countries of residence (Bawer 
2007; Goodwin 2013), many others find this sort of liaison all but reconciliatory and choose 
to dissolve into their host societies instead (Laurence and Vaisse 2006; Alba and Foner 2015). 
Distancing themselves gradually from the stereotypical, unrecognised and most criticised 
associations with minorities, this latter group seek ways to alleviate the longstanding 
prejudice in the majority eyes by manifesting allegiance to their countries of residence 
(Zarembka 2006). 
 
A frame of reference which could be cited in the same vein is ‘queue-jumping’. With its solid 
grounds in international law, reception of political refugees into the EU lands for instance 
holds precedence over many other visa types or entry clearances. A relatively secure 
immigrant status as this may offer, the fact that some immigrants ‘queue jump’ some others 
by this means is not always well-received (Boldero and Whelan 2011). While the issue seems 
at first sight to relate to granting rights to one group by highjacking those of others, who 
might have been waiting for a longer period, it may in fact be one of competition at the labour 
markets (Thio and Taylor 2012). The newcomers are accordingly seen as potential rivals for 
limited job opportunities at the lower end of the scale (Blakely and Leigh 2010; D’Amuri et 
al. 2009). 
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It should be noted that these inferences are not entirely drawn from the survey findings. As 
formerly stated, the research aim was to compare attitudes between nationals and non-
nationals towards an increasingly diversified ethnic landscape in Europe by way of a string of 
closed questions (yes/no). As the broader aim was to give a mere glimpse of the current 
debates in that regard, on the basis of five yes/no questions, there was no direct investigation 
of the whys and wherefores to the participants’ responses. The above-given conjectural notes 
–which are partially based on empirical evidence, as the attached references are meant to 
stand for- could for this reason serve as no more than a guiding background for the observed 
similarities between nationals and non-nationals throughout the study. 
 
Conclusion 
The political climate in Europe is at present anything but congenial for further diversification 
of the ethnic landscape. The widespread public perception that the opportunities immigrants 
bring along are outnumbered by the repercussions they produce (German Marshall Fund 
2013) renders multiculturalism as a state policy inimical to the interests of many EU lands for 
its ‘misleading representations of culture, or the justification it can provide for sacrificing the 
rights and interests of the individual’ (Phillips 2009, p. 72). With this permeating frame of 
mind, concerns for the ethnocultural status quo have started to reach out to a wider audience. 
The threats often perceived by nationals towards their cultural, linguistic and/or civic values 
startle now the non-national populations by the same token. 
 
A most relevant point of reference to consider in this regard is the EU’s latest rounds of 
enlargement. For the newest members, in particular the Central and Eastern European States 
(CEES), the end of the communist era was a much-awaited moment to re-establish their 
economic, political and cultural bonds with the rest of Europe. For the latter bit, however, the 
end of the Cold War was suggesting amongst others large-scale immigration from the CEES, 
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which -following numerous phases of Gastarbeiter recruitment and colonial immigration 
since the 1950s- was bound to diversify the ethnic landscape further. To be sure, in a host of 
old EU members to the north/west, there were serious concerns over not only the newcomers’ 
impacts on the labour market dynamics -the resident nationals’ reservations about losing their 
jobs- but also the complications immigrants could inflict on the societal cohesion. Amidst 
debates about which integration model should be most desirable on that score, there was soon 
in traditional traditional immigration countries like the UK, France, the Netherlands and 
Germany ‘a backlash and retreat from multiculturalism, and a reassertion of ideas of nation 
building, common values and identity, and unitary citizenship — even a call for the “return of 
assimilation”’ (Kymlicka 2012, p.7). 
 
Of all relevant matters relating to ‘the coexistence of different identities within a single 
nation, thus directly addressing issues about the limits of toleration within liberal 
democracies’ (Guibernau 2010, p. 6), at stake has almost always been preservation of the 
ethnocultural status, rather than expansion of shared values in quest of an all-embracing and 
cohesive society. Given the security-driven post-9/11 world order, the pervasive terrorism 
discourse and anti-immigrant mood across many EU lands currently, the resident non-
nationals feel largely apprehensive about the arrival of further newcomers and the 
accompanying spread of ethnocultural heterogeneity. In an atmosphere of hate, witch-hunting 
and intensifying xenophobia, the non-national populations learn to live with and face up to the 
ultra-nationalists of their countries of residence, where it is now a question of time the far-
right political parties could win the majority vote alone, their hitherto performances on the 
fringes notwithstanding.
3
  
 
                                                 
3
 The Dutch and Austrian Freedom Parties, the French National Front or the Hungarian Jobbik are to name a 
few. 
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Overall, in analysing public attitudes towards the changing ethnic landscape in contemporary 
Europe, oversimplification of non-national residents may give a false colour to their patterns 
of behaviour. In the face of an unremitting immigration pressure over the last decades, many 
of these have been acting in alignment with the nationals and the accepted norms of their host 
societies. For future research, this tendency seems to offer challenges to reconsidering the 
processes of adaptation, acculturation, integration and/or assimilation within the broader 
context of immigration. 
 
In the end, as noses alter faces and circumstances alter cases in Europe’s current immigration 
context, the old stereotypes do not provide an accurate guide to predicting the non-nationals’ 
patterns of behaviour, as far as issues concerning the ethnocultural status quo are concerned. 
It seems many of them simply conduct themselves along with the accepted norms of their host 
societies. 
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